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The disastrous human
and environmental effects of Soviet
collectivization on Kazakhstan
by James Mayfield (Chairman, European Heritage Library)
this Article • About
the Author • Citations • Bibliography/Sources
See the current effects
of the Soviet collectivization and water diversion legacy
on Kazakhstan today in pictures at the bottom.
Arguably the most drastic
economic policy employed by Marxist-fashioned governments
and the Soviet Union was that of agricultural and industrial
collectivization. Forcing local Soviets to develop state-controlled
farms and industrial construction projects, the Soviet collectivization
programs generally had two overarching purposes: the ideological
liberation of the Soviet orbit from class antagonisms and
the concupiscent parasitism of “kulak” banditry, and the economic
attainment of a fiscally self-sufficient Marxist society.
Soviet republics endured two major phases of collectivization
that yielded both beneficial and catastrophic effects. The
Stalin government (1922-53) initiated collectivization projects
as a means to cultivate “socialism in one country,” with an
industrialized war machine and a well-fed population completely
free of the capitalist approach. As the Comintern and NATO
plunged into the Cold War, the Khrushchev government (1953-64)
reimposed agricultural collectivization with the so-called
“Virgin Lands Program” specifically with the intent of freeing
the USSR from humiliating dependency on Western capitalist
food imports. Soviet collectivization made possible economic
and industrial achievements that would otherwise have been
impossible. However, the blatant accomplishments of collectivization
came at a tremendous price, directly creating some of the
most horrendous human and environmental catastrophes of the
In both phases of Soviet collectivization, the people of Kazakhstan
endured by far the worst of these disasters, suffering man-made
famines and starvation, irreparable environmental desiccation,
the eventual transformation of the entire Aral Sea to saline
ruin, mass exodus and displacement, and astronomical casualty.
Even worse, the second phase of collectivization (the Virgin
Lands Campaign) only exacerbated the irrecoverable environmental
tragedies of the first phase. These disasters are entirely
derived from the legacy of collectivization.1 Despite the
Soviets' ideological insistence on the benefits of collectivization
programs in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh people experienced far
greater suffering and calamity than they profited, and are
still struggling to recover from the ecological consequences
Stalin's first phase of Soviet collectivization represents
easily the worst physical and environmental nadir of Kazakh
history. The collectivization initiative began almost immediately
after the final incorporation of the Kazakh tribes and polities
into the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1936. The
agricultural potential of the fertile and pristine Kazakh
steppe was perceived as an invaluable source of tremendous
collective output for the state. As in the other, recently
“liberated” peoples newly incorporated into the USSR, those
Kazakhs that were fully absorbed into Soviet society through
forced collectivization would eventually enjoy significant
benefits that would have otherwise been impossible for the
semi-nomadic Kazakhs, such as theoretically near-universal
literacy and employment, the development of urbanized cities
and transportation systems, health care, job security, and
sustenance. Although the majority of these benefits owe themselves
to Soviet policy rather than collectivization itself, these
accomplishments must be weighed with the tragic consequences
if we are to conclude that collectivization had an overall
negative effect on Kazakh society.
Ideological propaganda by the Russian Communist Party and
the Kazakh CP emphasized collectivization's undeniable eventual
benefits and ignored its disastrous costs. The occurrence
of famines or negative consequences of collectivization were
even buried and censured until the Glasnost era of the Gorbachev
regime of the 1980's.2 Kazakh Communist Party pamphlets espoused
that collectivization transformed the Kazakh SSR from a class-stratified
backwater of tribal infighting into a socialist paradise.
It was reported that the Kazakh SSR went from being a mere
2.8 percent of Imperial Russia's agricultural output to the
Soviet Union's breadbasket, thus preventing Moscow from in
any way taking advantage of the Kazakh people because of the
important role they played in Soviet macroeconomics.3 Collectivization
allowed for the construction of the massive Balkash copper
works, the Leninogorsk polymetal factory, the Amlaty heavy
metal producers, the Chimkent leadworks, and the Kounrad copper
mines. The huge Karaganda industrial center was akin to Russia's
exemplary Magnetogorsk.4 These new industrial collectives
indeed allowed Kazakhs to inject themselves into the Soviet
labor system and its social security. Official party organs
extolled that collectivization brought the Kazakh working
class from 20,000 in 1913 to 2,000,000 upon its completion.5
It went from a tribal, yurt-dwelling equestrian people to
the Soviet Union's foremost exporter of copper.6 It was portrayed
that the Soviet Union would not dare impose any policy that
generated suffering in Central Asia. Rather, the Moscow government
was a beneficent supporter of the Kazakhs, showering them
with tremendous investment in the interests of their liberation.7
In truth, the Kazakh steppe had been transformed by collectivization
into an integral, largely productive, and comparatively quite
urbanized socialist republic.
Despite these marked benefits that the first phase of Soviet
collectivization obviated in Kazakh society, a number of crucial
cultural, political, and environmental factors consigned the
Kazakhs to disaster and starvation at the same time. Ultimately,
the negative consequences, both long-term and immediate, would
far outweigh the triumphs. Stalin's program was firstly troubled
by the difficult reality that the majority of the Central
Asian SSRs were either barren desert or semiarid terrain,
requiring the concomitant construction of massive dams, irrigation
projects, and water diversion with an unforeseen or otherwise
ignored ecological and human toll. Many Soviet agronomists
and experts warned the Soviet government that the Kazakh steppe
was completely unfeasible for collectivization because of
this topographic problem, but the Party dismissed such admonition.8
In order to irrigate the inhospitable desert for new collective
projects, Kazakhstan's Amu Darya and Syr Darya tributaries
to the massive Aral Sea were diverted. As a result, the water
flowing into the crucial Aral Sea became a trickle unable
to even support sea level,9 splitting the sea into two lakes.
(The modern consequences of the Aral Sea disaster are covered
at the end of this essay). Immediately after the diversion
of the rivers, salinity and pesticide runoff from irrigated
collective farms made local waters deadly.10 As early as 1950
it was losing noticeable volume and by 1980 had decreased
by half.11 From 1956 and 1986 some 225km³ of water had been
diverted to irrigate the absurd Kara Kum Canal project in
the Turkmen SSR alone.12 Soviet mismanagement, drastic over-irrigation
and over-tilling knowingly caused ecological disaster as a
means to an end.13 Collectivization now polluted and depleted
the drinking water and fish supplies at the same time as collective
farms failed to meet basic sustenance needs.14 The environmental
and technical improvidence of the Soviet collectivization
program only exacerbated the local, human factors contributing
to the worst proportionate starvation in Soviet history.
Another major problem for Stalin's collectivization program
was the semi-nomadic nature of the Kazakh people who were,
overnight, expected to assimilate into an alien socialist
ethos. Early on, it was feared that the great contrast between
Kazakh culture and Western mores of industry, sedentary farming,
centralized authority, and especially the alien Communist
ideology would stymie hopes for efficient agricultural output
and industrial capacity. The lack of exposure of the Kazakhs
to the Marxist worldview inevitably caused them to interpret
the Soviet land and livestock seizures of collectivization
as the next phase of belligerent Russian imperialism. Kazakhs
of the 1930s were not espousing the anti-feudal polemics that
most would in the 1950s, especially since they had just emerged
from long-sought independence from Russian colonial rule as
the Alash Autonomy regime. The appearance of resistance movements
and armed revolt across Central Asia, such as that of the
reborn Basmaçi, can be seen as an interpretation of the proletarian
“liberation” as oppression by many Kazakhs.15 The foreign,
intrusive nature of collectivization was emphasized to Kazakhs
by the fact that massive ethnic Russian settlement for collectivization
efforts relegated the Kazakhs to being a minority in their
own country by 1933.16 Steady non-Kazakh settlement resulted
in the gradual phasing out of the Kazakh language, such that
even as late as 1990 40 percent had only a weak command of
Qazaq.17 The lack of a shared ideological and economic agenda
between the encroaching Soviet pioneers and the Kazakh tribes
made cataclysmic disaster an almost inevitable consequence
of collectivization in the Kazakh SSR.
Mass starvation was suffered almost immediately and pervasively
across the Kazakh steppe. The conflict between sedentarized
collective farming and semi-nomadic animal husbandry contributed
significantly to the resulting famine and exodus. Soviet officials
forced some 95 percent of the entire semi-nomadic rural population
to abandon their property for compulsory relocation to distant
state-owned farms by 1933.18 These collectives were improvidently
and poorly arranged in order to force the political subjugation
of Kazakh bands to the Soviet Union. In many collectives in
Kazakhstan, the newly-settled Kazakh families were given very
little or even no agricultural equipment, seeds, fertilizer,
or beasts of burden.19 The Kazakh people, whose ancient heritage
as steppe riders with wandering livestocks had been vanquished
in the interests of the Marxist collective, simply had no
expertise in the task of settled farming that they were ordered
to do with a metaphoric gun pressed against their temples.
The Soviets took no consideration in adapting their agricultural
methods for the semiarid steppe, instead applying the same
methods that they used in the disastrous collectivization
campaigns in lush European Ukraine as they did in desolate
Asian Kazakhstan. The Soviet collectivization policy was thus
more interested in gaining new labor and industrial output
than they were in the well-being of the Kazakh people. Risking
execution, many Kazakhs refused to go to work in the fields
in protest or because they simply did not have adequate supplies
to yield basic sustenance during an ever-worsening famine.20
The greatest crisis caused by collectivization that contributed
to the mass famine was the Kazakhs' intentional mass slaughtering
of cattle and sheep to avoid seizure by Soviet authorities.
The official population of registered cattle and sheep dropped
from 36,000 to 3,000 from 1929 to 1932 alone, resulting in
near civil war, as Kazakhs struggled to find scraps of food.21
Other reports cite 90 percent of livestock being decimated.22
Soviet proletarian “liberation” initiatives, such as the liquidation
of “kulaks” and the “bourgeoisie,” were broadly interpreted
as truculent, resulting in mass voluntary exodus from the
Soviet orbit. 40,000 families were “de-kulakized” (i.e. purged)
from 1930-33 alone.23 Families, villages, and nomadic camps
disappeared almost overnight due to executions, expulsions,
starvation, and especially fleeing. Households declined from
1,233,000 in 1929 to 565,000 in 1936.24 Tens of thousands
of Kazakhs and other Central Asians fled Soviet-created starvation
and anti-kulak aggression to Chinese warlord states, with
most starving to death in transit.25 The Kazakh steppe had
been transformed from a vast plain of semi-nomadic riders
into a warzone in the name of the socialist collective.
More than 1,500,000 Kazakhs lost their lives due to malnutrition,
mismanagement, executions, displacement, and overslaughtering,
totaling one-third of the population of the Kazakh SSR26.
Another statistic cites that some 40 percent of the total
population of 4.12 million Kazakhs died between 1930 and 1939.27
Proportionately to the republic's population, the Kazakh tragedy
is by far the worst famine in Soviet history, surpassing the
tragedy that the same collectivization policy inflicted on
the Ukrainian SSR (the Holodomor) at the exact same timeframe.
The disastrous famine was entirely caused by collectivization,
as seen by the statistical fact that the agricultural improvements
brought by collectivization had no hope of meeting basic need
for Kazakh survival. The population of Kazakhs with the nomadic
and livestock lifestyle was reduced from 80 percent in 1926
to 27.4 percent in 1930. In the same timeframe, however, the
population of Kazakhs successfully producing crop yields –
the intent of collectivization – only increased 17 percent.28
When coupled with the death of nearly all of Kazakhstan's
livestock, this means that the Kazakh people had been stripped
of all means of attaining basic sustenance, and had very little
food output from Soviet collectives to feed themselves. Nearly
all traditional methods and businesses that may yield food
outside the collectivization method, such as animal breeding
and independent crop planting, were banned.29 Thus, the Soviet
authorities enforcing the collectivization program directly
caused the decimation of the Kazakh population.
Collectivization had inflicted an incomprehensible cost on
the Kazakh people, as the Kazakh SSR was reshaped into a starving
and desolated wasteland. Skulls and bones could be seen littering
the collective fields and roads. Cases of cannibalism, even
of roadside human carrion, are ingrained in the memory of
Kazakhs who suffered the price of the Soviet collectivization
policy.30 Even today construction workers accidentally unearth
the skeletons of children who starved to death during the
Soviet collectivization program in the 1930s.31 The Soviets
in Kazakhstan imposed, sustained, and caused the starvation
and exodus of millions of citizens of the Kazakh SSR, ignoring
the tremendous cost of collectivization in order to achieve
the undeniable benefits. Unfortunate for nearly two million
Kazakhs, the disastrous consequences of collectivization far
outweigh the profits to the Kazakh people.
The second phase of collectivization in Kazakhstan (1950's-60's,
full-scale by 1954) was initiated for very different purposes
and with very different results than the first phase imposed
by Stalin. Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to invigorate
the romanticism of the self-sufficient Russian field peasant,
as well as to break the USSR's embarrassing status of dependency
upon Western grain imports in order to become an exporting,
well-fed Communist paradise by 1980. Yet again the Kazakhs
bore the physical and environmental brunt of this collectivization
policy far more than any other SSR. The vast and idle lands
of the Kazakh steppe were deemed the ideal candidate for a
massive new agricultural collectivization project known as
the “Virgin Lands Campaign.” The fertile Ukrainian SSR was
to be geared towards dairy and meat, the Kazakh SSR to grain
and rice, and the Uzbek SSR to cotton exports.32 Although
the second phase of collectivization in Kazakhstan would not
result in mass famine, exodus, and death, it would further
offset the balance between ethnic Kazakhs and Russians in
the Kazakh SSR, and tragically inflict almost unparalleled
man-made ecological disasters that only exacerbated the calamities
of the first program some thirty years earlier.
The Virgin Lands Campaign, like the first collectivization
phase, incurred far greater benefits to the Soviet government
and to the non-Kazakh pioneers than it profited the Kazakh
people. More than six million people from outside of Kazakhstan
(300,000 in 1954 alone33) settled in the virgin fields of
northern Kazakhstan, igniting already-dormant ethnic conflicts
between Kazakhs and Russian settlers that went back to the
late Imperial period. Some 12,500 combine tractors and 3,500
self-propelled combines were sent to the new collective farms.34
The Kazakhs were seldom even involved in the Virgin Lands
program; they reaped little of what little benefit resulted,
but all of the terrible consequences. In fact, the incoming
Soviets literally forced the Kazakhs living in the northern
virgin lands out of their homes to be relocated for non-Kazakh
pioneers to settle.35 Many Kazakh Communist politicians opposed
the Russian settlement because they rightly feared that this
collectivization program would only further weaken the ethnic
Kazakh control of the Kazakh SSR over the more powerful ethnic
The second collectivization campaign yielded even fewer benefits
than that of Stalin, and was only an ephemeral agricultural
and economic success. Initially, the collective farms in Kazakhstan
produced three times as much grain in 1956 as in 1953.37 Moscow
quadrupled its investment in the Kazakh SSR, allowing over
37,000,000 hectares to be under corn and grain cultivation
by 1962.38 13,000,000 were reported as yield.39 Kazakh party
pamphlets celebrated that Khrushchev's collectivization elevated
the Kazakh SSR to the honorary and respectable status of a
breadbasket. They reported that sixteen million tonnes of
grain were exported from Kazakhstan in 1956 alone,40 and that
the collectivization campaign resulted in the tripling of
the sheep population, a fifty percent increase in cattle,
a tripling of meat, a doubling of milk, and an eighty percent
increase in eggs, turning “70,000 tonnes of waste into 10,000
million rubles.”41 Propaganda was intentionally hiding the
fact that in 1952 the Soviet regime reported an eight billion
poon yield when only 5.2 billion poons were harvested.42
The initial success of the Virgin Lands Campaign was bound
for inevitable ecological disaster. Khrushchev knowingly dismissed
and sacked the admonitions of agronomists who warned that
the Kazakh steppe was just as unworkable as it was in the
first collectivization program.43 The chairman of the Kazakh
Communist Party, Dinmohammad Kunayev, was even derided by
Kazakhs during the Virgin Lands collectivization for “gross
violation of agro-technology, poor cultivation of the soil
and contamination of fields, sowing with poor-quality seed,
and loss of grain during harvesting.”44 Like Stalin, the Khrushchev
regime cared more for quick results during the tense Cold
War than the inevitability of long-term calamity for the Kazakh
people. Khrushchev encouraged pioneers and collective farmers
to pay more attention to their state-owned farms and the Virgin
Lands program than their local plots, 45 thus allowing proven
crops to fail at the same time as the doomed Virgin Lands
crops fell to ruin. Despite warnings from Soviet experts,
authorities imposed poor cultivation methods and refused to
practice crucial crop rotation that was so desperately needed
in the first collectivization campaign.46 47 The pioneers
also tore out huge tracts of vegetation and nutrients to make
way for impractical irrigation projects, thus consigning the
nutrient-bereft soil to erosion. The Kazakh steppe's powerful
winds then tore up what little fertile land remained, and
blew them astray in massive dust storms that not only further
depleted the remaining nutrients but decimated other collectives
across the whole Kazakh SSR. This “dust bowl” phenomenon rendered
the “virgin and idle lands” into a barren wasteland, a legacy
of the overall disastrous effects of collectivization on the
The mismanagement and improvidence of the Soviet pioneers
– preferring immediate socialism and results at any cost –
ended in awful failure that only compounded the Soviets' status
as being dependent on Western food imports. By the end of
the program, Moscow struggled to avoid burgeoning famine,
and was forced to import some 11,000,000 tonnes of grain from
capitalist nations, and 2,000,000 from the United States in
1963 alone.48 Dust storms, soil and nutrient depletion, and
vegetation removal – all either directly caused or severely
exacerbated by Soviet collectivization in Kazakhstan – eventually
desolated more than 4,000,000 hectares of fertile land from
1960-65 alone, with more than 12,000,000 hectares rendered
useless. The Soviet dream of collectivized socialism had even
made it difficult for Kazakh farmers to see the sun at noon
because of dust storms caused by over-plowing and over-planting.49
Nitrogen, sulfur, and other crucial soil nutrients were swept
away by the dust storms to the point that it may take centuries
to recover.50 Worse yet, the complete pilfering of shrubbery
and vegetation made the soil worthless for non-collective
animal grazing and farming for Kazakhs after independence.51
The Virgin Lands Campaign exacerbated the soil erosion, water
depletion, and dust storms that were knowingly created by
Stalin's first collectivization campaign in the interests
of “socialism in one country.” Both campaigns promised ideological
liberation and agricultural cornucopia, but ultimately came
at the cost of tremendous environmental ruin and sorrow which
endure and worsen today.
The most enduring legacy of Soviet collectivization in Kazakhstan,
as well as the most salient proof that collectivization inflicted
far greater harm than benefit on the Kazakhs, is the continuing
desiccation of the Aral Sea basin in now-independent Kazakhstan.
Its conversion from the sixth largest inland body of water
to a desolate saline valley is entirely a man-made consequence
of collectivization due to the conscious diversion of the
Amu Darya and Syr Darya tributaries in the 1930's. The over-irrigation,
over-tilling, decimation of vegetation, and brutal dust storms
caused by both collectivization campaigns only worsened the
desertification of the Aral Sea. Since 1961 the water level
has declined with increasing speed from 20 to 80-90 centimeters
per year, its volume reduced by 75 percent from 1960 to 1995.
The Aral Sea, going from the sixth largest sea to the fourth,52
has even split into two separate lakes, with a third lake
presaged for the coming tragic future.53 A massive desert
formed out of the former Aral Sea has even been called “Aralkum”
(“Aral Sands”). Some parts of the shore are 120km from where
they used to be.54 Today, the Aral Sea is a mere 10 percent
of its former self, entirely as a consequence of collectivization.55
As a result of the Virgin Lands Campaign especially, dust
storms blow up to 100,000,000 tonnes of dust out of the Aral
Sea annually, bringing the pesticides, toxins, fertilizers,
chemicals, urban wastes, and aerosols from former collectives
to decimate the flora, fauna, and crops of today's Kazakh
farmers in its wake.56 The vegetation season has been reduced
to only 170 days due to the desolation wrought by collectivization,
the pasture productivity reduced by half, and meadow productivity
cut tenfold. Traces of toxic wastes and pesticides from over-irrigated
collectives have been blown from the Aral Sea basin as far
away as Greenland and Norway.57 Nearly all of the fish in
this once-flourishing sea are now dead due to over 18 percent
salinity in 1980, thus depriving this dry and undernourished
steppe country from a crucial source of food and private fishing.58
The once-flourishing fishing industry of more than 44,000
tonnes per year has almost vanquished,59 leaving thousands
of fishing boats to rust in the sands of the new Aral Desert
in apocalypse-like ship graveyards. Previously profitable
seaside hotels are now in the middle of the wasteland, leading
to bankruptcy and recession in what few market opportunities
everyday Kazakhs can exploit. The collectivization program,
initially intended to allow once-nomadic Kazakhs to enjoy
lifetime work security and sustenance, has relegated many
to financial oblivion, poverty, and health crisis.
The pesticides, chemicals, aeolian dust, and toxins spread
by dust storms are almost universally believed to be the direct
cause of a tremendous prevalence of respiratory maladies and
cancers. Toxins and chemicals enter the food chain and thence
the Kazakh people. This is believed to be a salient cause
of the fact that Kazakhstan has the highest child mortality
rate in the ex-USSR, and especially the highest rate of esophageal
cancer around the Aral Sea basin due to pesticide inhalation.60
Inordinately high cases of tuberculosis and other diseases
are also reported.61 There is a high trace of ailment-causing
lead in the water supply because of runoff from once-collectivized
industries, factories, and leadworks like Chimkent, which
is in turn carried across the country by the dust storms.62
Saparbey Kazahbayev, a Kazakh biologist, personally believes
that the reason for his huge esophageal tumor, as well as
the death and sickness of so many others are entirely resultant
from toxins and pesticides spread adrift by the desiccation
and pollution born of the Soviet collectivization legacy.63
For this modern environmental crisis, lugubrious protection
efforts by the Nazarbayev government – understandably preferring
the oil and gas investment over environmental issues – allows
this ecological catastrophe to worsen unchecked.
The long-term unforeseen consequences wrought by collectivization
in Central Asia have even been whimsically linked to fears
of terrorism and biological warfare. Rebel movements in the
breakaway Karakalpakstan autonomous region in Uzbekistan specifically
cite their disastrous environmental situation – one entirely
caused by collectivization – as an impetus to their revolt
against the Uzbek government for independence. Another, more
ominous and globally significant concern also owes itself
to the enduring legacy of Soviet rule and mismanagement. The
small Aral Sea island of Vozrozhdeniye was used by the Soviets
as a biological weapons test site for fifty years, and has
functioned as a storage site for anthrax, the plague, smallpox,
tularemia, and numerous other chemical and biological weapons
since the Soviets dumped them there in 1988. With the Aral
Sea crisis, the island has increased in size and is now almost
touching the ever-receding shoreline. Several researchers
and terrorism experts fear that rodents and even dust storms
may carry these deadly traces to local human populations or
be carried by the wind all across Central Asia and beyond.64
An unforeseen consequence not intended by the Soviets during
collectivization, Vozrozhdeniye has been described as a “ticking
time bomb” for now-independent Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
It must be acknowledged that the Soviet Union never intended
to directly inflict any physical catastrophe on the Soviet
republics or the Kazakh people. It must also be readily emphasized
that the Soviet collectivization policy eventually contributed
to undeniable industrial, political, cultural, and employment
achievements, which transformed tribal Kazakhstan into a modern
republic and an exporter of anything from steel, to cotton,
to Snow Queen® vodka. But the price that the Kazakh people
were forced to pay was far too high. Both phases of collectivization
have inflicted an indelible legacy of agricultural ruin, economic
depression, physical ailment, and environmental catastrophe
that far outweigh the benefits of the forced proletarian liberation
brought by the Soviet Union. Unfortunate for the Kazakhs,
the tragic legacy of calamitous Soviet agro-economic policy
did not fall with the Berlin Wall, and it may require centuries
The changing size of the Aral Sea, a direct resut of Soviet
collectivization and water diversion projects
James Mayfield is a historian
and the Chairman of the European Heritage Library. I have
a Cum Laude BA in History with a Minor in Germanic Studies
(language and history), am presently working for my Masters
in History, and plan to immediately progress to my PhD Doctorate.
I have a special academic interest in Europe's diverse ethnic
identities, languages, and cultures, and the political struggles
of native European and immigrant minority identities. See
my staff entry for more information.
- Kathleen O. Galvin et al., Fragmentation
in Arid and Semi-Arid Landscapes (New York: Springer Press,
- Sheila Fitzpatrick and Lynne Viola,
A Researcher's Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History
in the 1930s (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 119.
- Dinmohammad Kunayev, “Kazakhstan:
Seven-Year Plan for Prosperity,” The Fifteen Soviet Republics
Today and Tomorrow 60E (1959): 5.
- Kunayev 1959, 7.
- Ibid., 8.
- Ibid., 11.
- Ibid., 14.
- Fitzpatrick et al. 1992, 119.
- UNEP/GRID-Arendal. “Aral Sea,”
United Nations Environmental Programme, http://enrin.grida.no/aral/aralsea/english/arsea/arsea.htm.
- Douglas Weiner, A Little Corner
of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 415.
- Weiner 2002, 415.
- Philip P. Micklin, “Desiccation
of the Aral Sea: A Water Management Disaster in the Soviet
Union,” Science Vol. 241, No. 4870 (1998): 1171.
- Kerstin Lindahl Kiessling, “Conference
on the Aral Sea: Women, Children, Health, amd Environment,”
Ambio Vol. 27, No. 7 (1998): 560.
- Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist
Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 478.
- Robert Conquest, The Harvest of
Sorrow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 189.
- Keith Rosten, Once in Kazakhstan:
The Snow Leopard Emerges (Bloomington, IN: IUniverse Press,
- Saulesh Esenova, “Soviet nationality,
identity, and ethnicity in Central Asia: historic narratives
and Kazakh ethnic identity,” Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs 22 (2002): 21.
- Galvin et al. 2007, 161.
- Conquest 1987, 193.
- Fitzpatrick and Viola 1992, 119.
- Hosking 1992, 244.
- Radio Free Europe, “Kazakhstan:
the forgotten famine,” Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079304.html.
- Conquest 1987, 189.
- Ibid., 190.
- Rashid Ahmed, Jihad: The Rise of
Militant Islam in Central Asia (New York, Penguin, 2002),
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- Rashid 2002, 75.
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- William Taubman, Khrushchev: The
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- Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs
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- Michael H. Glantz, Drought Follows
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- Hosking 1992, 357.
- Ibid., 358.
- Richard Mills, “The formation of
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- Ibid., 18.
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